How Does Macroeconomic Change Affect Social Identity (and Vice Versa?): Insights from the European Context by Abrams, Dominic & Vasiljevic, Milica
1 
  
MACROECONOMY AND IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Does Macroeconomic Change Affect Social Identity (and Vice Versa?): Insights 
from the European Context 
 
Dominic Abrams 
& 
Milica Vasiljevic 
 
Author’s Notes:  
Dominic Abrams, Centre for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent, UK, e-mail: 
d.abrams@kent.ac.uk  
Milica Vasiljevic, Centre for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent, UK, and 
Behaviour and Health Research Unit, University of Cambridge, UK, e-mail: 
milica.vasiljevic@medschl.cam.ac.uk 
The authors have contributed equally to the writing of this manuscript. 
Research for this paper was supported by a grant awarded to the authors by the UK 
Government Office for Science. 
This article is available on-line published by Wiley and the Society for the Psychological Study of 
Social Issues as  
Abrams, D., & Vasiljevic, M. (2014). How Does Macroeconomic Change Affect Social Identity 
(and Vice Versa?): Insights from the European Context. Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 14 
(1), 311-338. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/asap.12052. (doi: 10.1111/asap.12052) 
2 
  
MACROECONOMY AND IDENTITY 
 
Abstract 
Economic strategies are largely driven by political and economic considerations. However, we 
contend that social psychological processes, particularly identity, play an important role and 
should also be a focus for policy strategies. We review evidence on how changes in the 
macroeconomy can impact social identities, and vice versa. Drawing on social psychological 
theories of identity and categorization, and using the current European context as a main 
example, we consider how large scale events (both positive and negative) affect the economy and 
how this articulates with people’s identities. The review considers how consumerism, 
consumption patterns, and consumer confidence relate to changes in identity. It also considers 
the consequences of macroeconomic change for social cohesion. We describe a novel model that 
sets out the likely opportunities and challenges for individuals, groups, and society, in the context 
of future macroeconomic scenarios: recession, stagnation, and growth. The review highlights the 
bidirectional nature of the relationship between the economy and social identity, and calls for 
policy makers to consider social psychological perspectives when developing economic 
strategies.   
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What are the social and psychological factors that link economic and other ‘external’ changes 
to people’s sense of identity, and how does identity bear on social and economic behavior? In 
this article, using Europe as our example, we first set the scene in terms of the European 
economic context and its wider relevance, then, propose a framework for understanding identity 
and economic change. We begin by reviewing the effects of large scale events on the 
macroeconomy and on people’s identities. We consider the relationship between consumerism, 
consumptions patterns, and identity. We propose ways that the macroeconomy impacts how 
people categorize one another into different groups, as well as how these categorizations can 
have a bearing upon the macroeconomy. After reviewing literature relating macroeconomic 
circumstances to social cohesion we conclude by setting out  scenarios for possible changes in 
social identities and social relations in the context of three different economic futures – 
recession, stagnation, and growth.  
The motivation for this article stems from the need to understand psychological processes 
associated with the major 2007 banking crisis that affected many western countries, albeit with 
distinctive effects in the USA and in Europe. In the European context, following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the Wall Street crash, it became clear that European banks were also 
deeply overcommitted and had insufficient funds to cover their debts. The banking crash 
affected all European countries.  Major defaults and bailouts occurred in Iceland, Ireland and 
Greece.  Cyprus, Slovenia and countries including Italy, Portugal, and Spain are in very serious 
economic difficulties and some non-Eurozone countries, such as the UK, have also had to 
introduce severe austerity measures. Across the EU,  wealthier economies such as Germany and 
France have had to make enormous contributions to enable the European Central Bank to 
bolster the Euro and help to guarantee the debts of other member countries. This turmoil has 
resulted in  people and organizations losing investments, long term substantial cuts in public 
sector salaries, massive rises in unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, and cuts to 
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services, pensions and welfare benefits. In addition, governments have increased levels of 
taxation, both via direct and indirect methods (Clarke & Daley, 2010; Eurozone crisis explained, 
2012). It seems inconceivable that such events have left citizens’  social identities untouched, and 
it also seems likely that social identity itself plays a part in their responses to these circumstances. 
Countries in the European Union are explicitly interdependent but economic crisis within 
Europe also intersects with and influences economic conditions elsewhere in the world, 
highlighting our global interdependence. Moreover, patterns of responses to downturn in 
Europe (e.g., conflicts among regions and countries, the rise of nationalist and neo-fascist 
movements such as the English Defence League in the UK, and Golden Dawn in Greece) may 
have parallels in, and relevance to, other continents and federations. 
A Social Identity Perspective 
 Based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), our starting assumption is  that 
people’s identities can be considered in terms of their linkage to different levels of social 
structure – in terms of interpersonal relationships, small or local group memberships, and in 
terms of societal systems and organizations (Abrams & Christian, 2007; Doise, 1978). Identity 
can become more or less engaged (linking in) with these levels, and thereby becomes implicated 
in responses ranging from cooperation to  competition, acceptance or resistance, mobilization or 
indifference. The questions we pose are: how do economic (and other) conditions relate to these 
different types of engagement, and what are the bidirectional implications of positive and 
negative economic (and other) changes, and changes in identity?  
There are many social scientific perspectives on these questions, including economic, 
sociological and anthropological.  The goal of this article, however, is to consider specifically 
how social identity, a social psychological concept, is implicated. Thus we address the 
psychological processes that relate macrosocial structures and changes to the collective self-
concept and related motives and behavior. We also recognize that different approaches in 
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psychology might have different things to say (e.g., evolutionary, neuroscience, discursive). In 
this paper, we offer a perspective framed predominantly by social psychological theory and 
research, in particular social identity theory (Tajfel & J. C. Turner, 1979; see also Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988). 
Social identity theory holds that  identity is defined along a continuum from the personal to 
the social, and is derived relationally within a broader social context of power and social 
relations. Throughout the paper we refer to identities that are ascribed (such as gender or race) 
or elective (such as a political or protest group) but also identities derived from roles or statuses 
that may be involuntary (e.g., unemployment). In a nutshell, we regard identity as the self-
perception or ascription of a social category together with the meaning and value of that self-
categorization. Therefore it can embrace ascribed, achieved and other types of identity, both long 
term and transitory (see Abrams, 2013 for a more detailed review).   
 Tajfel’s (1974, 1981) original work yielded two connected but distinguishable parts of the 
theory, both of which are relevant for the present discussion. The “social identity theory of 
intergroup relations” (Tajfel & J. C. Turner, 1979) addressed conflict and struggle between 
groups within a larger social structure – the intergroup dynamics of social change. Tajfel wanted 
to understand how shared categorization or social identity affects people’s actions in the context 
of the wider social structure. The theory considered how ingroups and relevant outgroups 
acquire psychological value and meaning through people’s understanding of their relationship in 
the context of society as a whole (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & J. C. Turner, 1979). 
Subsequently the “social identity theory of the group” (J. C. Turner, 1985), later formulated 
as self-categorization theory (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), explained 
the social cognitive processes that link the self and a group. These group and intergroup parts of 
social identity combine to provide a framework to explain phenomena such as prejudice, group 
cohesion, leadership, social influence, and the self-concept. Centrally, the theory holds that 
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intergroup relations, intragroup relations, and the self are strongly interconnected so that they 
can have reciprocal influence. Thus, the theory is highly relevant for considering the impact of 
social structural change on identity and vice versa. 
Psychological research has shown that people apply and use categories to simplify their 
complex worlds and save cognitive energy (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Doise, 1978; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001; J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987), but also, to fulfill their need to belong, and have a structured and meaningful environment 
(Williams, 2007). People display ingroup favoritism by preferring other individuals who share a 
common category membership with themselves (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, Harvey, 
White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). This ingroup bias happens even in experiments when people are 
put into ‘minimal’ groups randomly without any prior interpersonal contact (Tajfel, 1978, 1981). 
Moreover, in real groups, where ingroup/outgroup boundaries are well-established, and people 
view one another in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, various factors can continually reinforce the 
divisions, and differences become imbued with value to the point where they become non-
negotiable and result in intractable conflict. Examples might be the Palestinian and Israeli 
conflict, and the struggles in Northern Ireland (Bar-Tal, 2013).  
Social psychologists have sought to establish ways in which this ingroup favoritism can be 
ameliorated. One approach is to bring groups into situations in which members can have 
positive contact and form friendships across group boundaries. Intergroup contact interventions 
are undoubtedly effective (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), but not always feasible. Much effort has 
succeeded in finding feasible alternatives to actual contact. These range from education, indirect 
or ‘extended’ contact through friends of friends, and even merely imagining contact (R. N. 
Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 2007; see Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011). Other interventions 
have sought to emphasize the common, overarching identities that people share as a way to 
decrease perceptions of intergroup differences (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
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Though the social identity perspective has inspired a vast body of literature, there has been 
relatively little effort to connect social identity theory to the extant literature on real world 
macroeconomic change. This is surprising given that social identity theory highlights that a 
group’s status in a wider intergroup context impacts directly on its members’ identification and 
motivation (Abrams, 2013). By status, we refer to the standing, prestige, power and resources 
that affect a group’s claim to superiority or its perceived inferiority relative to other relevant 
groups. Because a group’s status can be vulnerable in terms of its perceived wider legitimacy, its 
stability, and the prospects for change, factors that have implications for a group’s social status 
are likely to motivate different types of behavior among its members (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 1999).  Note that the term ‘minority’ is often used to describe lower status, marginalized 
or stigmatized groups. However, we prefer to reserve the term minority for numerical minorities 
because some numerical minorities are actually elites within status systems. Therefore, rather 
than use the term ‘minority’ we refer to lower and higher status groups in this article. Moreover 
status as defined by social identity theory does not simply mean socio-economic status, which is 
defined by objective factors such as income and education (cf. Diemer, Mistry, Wadsworth, 
López, & Reimers, 2012. Instead it refers to a groups ranking in a social hierarchy relative to 
other psychologically relevant groups. 
Recently, Fadjukoff, Kokko, and Pulkkinen (2010) provided preliminary evidence relating 
changing macroeconomic circumstances to people’s identities in adulthood. In a longitudinal 
study, they found that during a macroeconomic boom individuals were more committed to their 
occupational identities than their political identities, but the reverse pattern was apparent in times 
of macroeconomic downturn. However, because the time of macroeconomic downturn 
coincided with participants’ older age pre-retirement, their lower endorsement of occupational 
identities during downturns may have been an artifact of the current pre-occupations of the 
aging participants that were nearing retirement. More importantly,  Fadjukoff et al. did not 
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consider the possibility that the macroeconomy and identity could be bidirectionally influential, 
as proposed in this article. 
In the section that follows we consider the impact of large scale external events on the 
economy and on people’s identities.  This prepares the ground for our overall framework for the 
bidirectional relationships between  the economy and people’s identities.   
Impact of External Events on Economies and Identity 
Previous literature has described how significant events affect the economy, and also there 
has been separate literature looking at how world events impact people’s identities but there has 
been no concerted attempt to relate these diverse literatures. Significant world events such as the 
9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre have a substantial effect on the macroeconomy 
within and across countries, which in turn impacts consumer confidence. For example, 
consumer confidence in the USA and globally dropped sharply following the 9/11 attacks,  
resulting in reduced consumer spending. Consumers preferred to save, and repay their credit 
card debts, and engaged in less consumerism. This was particularly noticeable in the airline, 
hotel, travel, and tourism industries (Virgo, 2001). Lower consumer confidence was 
accompanied by a sharp increase in global unemployment, which had implications for people’s 
ascribed identities (i.e., gender, race) as well as elective identities (i.e., protest groups, support 
football teams). Consumer confidence started to recover by the end of 2001 (Garner, 2002), and 
the macroeconomy managed to recover rather well, demonstrating high levels of resilience to 
catastrophic sudden events (Jackson, 2008). Similar evidence for macroeconomic resilience was 
highlighted by Varvares (2001) who pointed out that when consumer confidence was shaken by 
previous large scale events, such as Pearl Harbor (1941), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), or the 
Gulf War of 1990, subsequent downturns of the macroeconomy were short lived, and in most 
cases recovered within two years. It is also noteworthy that some countries appear to have coped 
with catastrophic events without undergoing obvious wholesale changes in either economic 
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prospects or identities. Examples include the 2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in 
Iceland, the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and the related melt down of the Fukushima 
nuclear plant in Japan (2011). Indeed, while some events appear to be a catalyst for people’s 
rejection of authority (such as may have happened in the 2011 London riots) other events, often 
tragedies such as mass shootings (Tyrifjorden in Norway, 2011; Sandy Hook in the USA, 2012) 
or accidents (BP Oil spill, 2010), seem to produce greater cohesion, caring and mutual tolerance 
within communities that are affected (Hawdon, Oksanen, & Rasanen, 2012). It seems plausible 
that, in the face of such external events, this resilience may reflect the way that identities and 
economic circumstances become intertwined.  
Consumer confidence and consumerism are not the only variables that are affected by large 
scale events. In the salient example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks some scholars argue that 
people’s identities also changed (Wee, 2004). For example, people showed heightened patriotism 
and more prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims (Coryn, Beale, & Myers, 2004). They became 
more conservative and showed increased support for leaders, such as Bush, and for radical anti-
terrorist legislation (Landau et al., 2004). At the same time, in the aftermath of 9/11, some 
Muslims became more radical and showed increased support for Islamic fundamentalism 
(Rabasa et al., 2004).  Although there is a common presumption that external events affect 
economic conditions, which then constrain or determine individuals’ identities and actions, such 
evidence highlights that the influence between economic behavior and identity is unlikely to be 
unidirectional. 
Changes in consumer confidence and people’s identities may both arise from the greater 
uncertainty that ensues after events such as 9/11(Bird, 2002; Hand, Paez, & Sprigg, 2005; 
Jackson, 2008); from the increased anxiety (Coryn et al., 2004); or from the heightened ‘mortality 
salience’ – the psychological threat arising from being forced to consider one’s own mortality 
(Landau et al., 2004). Increased conservatism as well as increased radicalism can be explained by 
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people’s desire for meaning in moments of uncertainty (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & 
Abrams, 1993). According to uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007) in order to reduce 
uncertainty people are motivated to be part of a group characterized by a clear prototype and this 
presses individuals and groups towards more extreme or entrenched positions with less tolerance 
for internal dissent or diversity (Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). Similarly, uncertainty may polarize 
people such that they either cling more firmly to, and reinforce, existing social and political 
systems, or they strongly reject them, perhaps engaging in grassroots collective actions (e.g., Jost 
et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that it is not only negative large scale world events like 9/11 that can 
impact consumer confidence, consumerism, and people’s identities. Major sporting events such 
as the modern Olympic Games and the Football World Cup are largely portrayed as positive 
global events that attract as much, if not more, attention than natural disasters and economic 
changes in particular areas. Indeed, these particular sporting events provide a vehicle for rhetoric 
and ideologies that are used to frame sport as a tool to bring people and nations together in a 
healthy competitiveness, at the same time acting as a force for international peace and harmony 
amongst nations (Guillain, 1998; Tomlinson & Young, 2006). Since their inception these two 
large sporting events have been cultural and political in character, allowing remote cultures to 
present themselves to the world, but also on a political scale enabling even very small nations to 
attract attention and status globally (Simson & Jennings, 1992; Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998).  
Such events have served, sometimes deliberately, to shape people’s identities. The 1934 
World Cup in Italy served to strengthen consensus under fascism, and construct “a civic, 
nationalist religion through rituals such as sport and myths of the strong, heroic, ‘pure’ Italian” 
(Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p.7). Likewise, the 1936 Olympic Games in Germany served as a 
propaganda vehicle for the Nazi ideology and political regime (Guttmann, 1992). A good deal of 
social psychological research shows that people’s identification with national teams readily 
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provides as basis for loyalty and cohesion, even among young children (see Abrams, Rutland, 
Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009; Barrett, 2007; Bennett & Sani, 2004). These (sometimes temporary) 
identifications may be double edged as they can be good for identity, group cohesion and 
solidarity, but bad for tolerance and diversity (Abrams et al., 2009).  
Increasingly, sporting events have become a vehicle for promoting economic and 
commercial growth (Tomlinson & Young, 2006). For instance, Whang (2006) describes how, for 
Japan, hosting the 1964 Olympic Games was an opportunity to demonstrate its healing after 
World War II and even more importantly to demonstrate its technological advances on the 
international stage. Similarly, the 1988 Seoul Olympics were used by South Korea to propel the 
country into the world’s industrial and trade elite. As such, both these events were used to 
increase consumer confidence and encourage consumerism of goods (in particular technology) 
coming from Japan and South Korea. At the same time, these events helped change the publicly 
defined images projected by the two nations, showing their more open and modern character. In 
Japan’s case, this marked a departure from its association with Nazi Germany. In South Korea’s 
case, it bolstered an assertion of autonomy from the imperial oppression by Japan, and its 
growing economic presence in Asia (Whang, 2006). A group’s public image can be an important 
part of its members’ identity (cf. Luhtanen & Crocker, 1999). Therefore these geopolitical 
changes combined with economic resurgence, bolster the country’s status in an international 
context, with favorable implications for identity among their populations.  
Consumer Confidence, Consumerism, Consumption Patterns, and Identity 
  Levels of consumer confidence can have important and drastic effects on the 
macroeconomy. Increased consumer confidence results in greater growth via a demand effect, 
which increases output (Caleiro & Ramalho, 2007; European Commission, 2005a, 2006; 
Ludvigson, 2004; Nahuis & Jansen, 2004; Taylor & McNabb, 2007). However, the opposite 
effects can also occur. Output (growth), directly or unemployment, indirectly, can influence 
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consumer confidence (European Commission, 2005b; Mueller, 1966). Furthermore, consumer 
confidence is influenced by political evaluations and media coverage of economic conditions 
(Caleiro & Ramalho, 2007; De Boef & Kellstedt, 2004).  
Regardless of economic conditions, identity is bound up with  consumerism (as a 
behavioral profile) because products form a symbolic and sociological bridge between people 
and society (Carrier, 1990; Shaw & Shiu, 2002). For example, consumption of branded products 
and leisure choices such as music preferences are affected by people’s desire to endorse or 
display a particular identity (Abrams, 2009; Berger & Heath, 2007). People use consumption to 
attain both a comfortable level of uniqueness or distinctiveness (Brewer, 2003) and positive 
evaluation from others in the form of acceptance or respect for their social identity (Abrams, 
1994; Emler & Reicher, 1995; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). For example, after the 
reunification of East and West Germany, residents of East Germany internalized consumerism 
by approximating to the consumption level of West Germany. Furthermore, they expressed 
regional pride and nostalgia (coined Ostalgie) by buying certain types of products, such as East 
German foods, and previously popular Wartburg and Trabant cars (Staab, 1997). In a similar 
vein, Polish nationals increased their level of consumption with the emergence of the liberalized 
new market economy that replaced the shortage economy that dominated Poland prior to the 
1990s (Mroz, 2010).  
Conversely, governments seem quick to blame other countries for problems with 
consumer products. For example, when horsemeat was found in a Findus ‘beef burger’ in the 
UK, it sparked a Europe-wide outcry followed by scientific analysis of burger meat DNA across 
the continent, with immediate ‘suspects’ being pointed to recent and lower status minority 
member states such as Romania and Hungary (Findus Beef lasagna contained up to 100% 
horsemeat FSA says, 2013). Over time it emerged that the suspect meat was more likely to have 
come from or through the Netherlands (a high status country). Similarly, when a fungus affected 
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UK ash trees (‘Ash dieback’ fungus Chalara fraxinea in UK countryside, 2012), this was blamed 
on the lack of control of the disease being imported from Denmark. These outcries seemed to 
focus as much on blaming an outgroup as on the actual control and nature of the problem itself. 
Related to such defensive responses, consumers’ identities can influence the 
macroeconomy more positively through actively localist or nationalistic purchasing preferences 
(Smith, 1987). For example, Reierson (1966) found that a sample of American students 
consistently ranked US products as higher in quality when compared to European and Japanese 
products (for a similar example in the European context see Vestergaard, 1968). An even more 
striking example in which consumers impact the macroeconomy can be found in historical 
records during the period of the Nonimportation movement in the USA (1764-1776). The aim 
of this movement was very much related to national identity and political causes, namely the 
fight for independence from the British Empire, which was expressed by boycotting all British 
products (Santore, 1981; Witkowski, 1989). In addition, it is quite common for governments and 
companies to appeal to consumers’ identities by invoking ingroup symbols in the marketing of 
their products (e.g., the ‘Buy British’ campaign in the 1980s, labeling of products with national 
symbols and flags, etc.). Identity also guides consumption based on principled choices. People 
who identify as environmentally responsible consumers (or green consumers) are more likely to 
purchase products that possess eco-friendly attributes (Mainieri, Barnet, Valdero, Unipan, & 
Oskamp, 1997; Smith, 1990; Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; Tanner & Woelfing Kast, 2003; 
Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). However, this is not always the case, and research has shown that 
there is an attitude-behavior gap, whereby people may profess more positive ethical attitudes, 
that do not necessarily translate into actual ethical purchasing behavior (Boulstridge & Carrigan, 
2000; Rogers, 1998), and even consumers who identify as ethically responsible are willing to buy 
unethical products if the price of these products is considerably lower compared to the more 
ethical alternative (Creyer, 1997). Furthermore, the macroeconomy can have an impact on 
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people’s identification with and actual endorsement of socially responsible organizations and 
products. For example, Elferink (2010) related macroeconomic conditions to green consumerism 
by showing that in countries with an economic crisis, consumers with lower income who are 
more price-sensitive have lower preference for green products (see also Tsay, 2009). Moreover, 
Elferink’s analysis showed that only the most devoted green consumers are willing to suffer 
higher costs for environmentally friendly products during a recession.  
Social identity clearly affects rejection of certain consumer options. One salient example is 
the deliberate boycott and non-consumption of the services of Barclay’s Bank in Britain due to 
the bank’s involvement with the Apartheid in South Africa (Smith, 1987). Similar examples 
include the UK consumer boycott of Argentinean products, such as wine and corned beef during 
the Falklands crisis; as well as the international boycott of Nestlé for their sales and marketing of 
baby milk to the Third World.  
These examples of principled consumer choices highlight how certain groups within a 
society establish and reinforce shared identity that supports change in their consumption levels 
and patterns in response to circumstances within the wider economy. Consumption and 
investments are not just economic decisions, but are increasingly becoming social and political 
decisions imbued with moral significance (Vogel, 1975). By making ethical purchases, consumers 
exercise their consumer sovereignty and may attempt to control the business via the market 
(Smith, 1987). Furthermore, for many people the ability to verify the social responsibility of a 
business serves as a basis of trust building towards their products and services (Castaldo, Perrini, 
Misani, & Tencati, 2009; Chen, 2010; Pivato, Misani, & Tencati, 2008).  
The Role of the Macroeconomy in Framing Superordinate Social Identity 
Social identity derives its meaning both from lateral and vertical comparisons, but any 
intergroup comparison is also made in the context of a superordinate system (e.g. UK vs. 
Germany with Europe, Europe vs. USA within Western economies, etc.). The superordinate 
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category is important in terms of the overall goals, aspirations or resources for which groups may 
compete. Within Europe macroeconomic factors have also been related to attitudes towards the 
European unified identity. Those living in EU member states that are net recipients of EU 
resources express more positive attitudes towards the EU than do those living in relatively 
wealthier donor EU states that are attractive to migrants (Garry & Tilley, 2009). Furthermore, a 
study investigating mobility between EU states has shown that people who highly identify with 
the unified EU identity are more likely to migrate to another EU state and demonstrate greater 
support for EU institutions (Recchi, 2008). Thus, the structure of the macroeconomy appears to 
influence people’s desire to identify with their nation vis-àvis the EU as a whole.   
The unified currency is not just an economic means of integrating separate nations, but also a 
symbolic tool for strengthening the shared identity that is being molded within the EU. In Spain 
and Portugal for example both the national and superordinate European identities independently 
influence attitudes towards the Euro. Stronger European identity is associated with more 
positive attitudes towards the common currency. The Euro can serve as a symbol of a desirable 
shared identity, thus attracting support even when people have little understanding of its 
economic relevance (Luna-Arocas, Guzman, Quintanilla, & Farhangmehr, 2001). Similar findings 
have emerged in the Austrian context (Meier-Pesti & Kirchler, 2003). Moreover, according to 
Asher (2005) EU policy makers deliberately use images of architectural bridges on Euro notes to 
symbolize the integration of multiple nationalities and identities into a single overarching 
European identity. As the Euro illustrates, an important aspect of the linkage between 
macroeconomic circumstances and identity is the way that people categorize themselves and 
others. The UK government’s claim that the population must share the burden of spending cuts 
because ‘we are all in it together’ is in line with a strategy advocated by Gaertner and Dovidio’s 
(2000) ‘common ingroup identity’ approach to reducing conflict between groups. However, 
more recent work has shown that when groups do not have equal social status they receive such 
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messages very differently. Members of advantaged groups adopt the message and, perhaps 
paternalistically, accept some responsibility for the fate of those of lower status. Those from 
lower status groups are more likely to view such messages with suspicion, usually for good 
reason because they make resistance to the objectives of powerful groups more difficult 
(Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2012). 
More recent research has grappled with the fact that people’s identities and group 
memberships are often complex and multifaceted. Identity can be characterized both in terms of 
hierarchical elements (e.g., social psychologists are a subset of psychologists, who are a subset of 
social scientists, and so on), and cross cutting categories (e.g., we also have gender, age). In turn 
each of these elements relates to varying depths of history in terms of connections with other 
individuals and groups. In the European context, people’s identification with their nation can be 
considered as a ‘basic’ level of categorization (cf. Rosch, 1978), whilst the superordinate identity 
of European citizen, and the subordinate regional identities, can be less diagnostic of their 
alliances within the social structure at any point in time. This could have implications for the 
future of the European Union because, in times of economic hardship, citizens of individual 
countries may be less willing to identify with and defend a social structure that does not fit with 
their basic level of categorization. Thus, the EU may be vulnerable to fracturing into national 
identities, as a result of strains from  the economic crisis.  
There is enormous psychological flexibility in how people construe their identities in 
response to different situations. Therefore, the same individuals may be as capable of acts of 
heroism as acts of brutality, and groups that may be internally characterized by great loyalty, 
devotion and self-regulation can sometimes mobilize their members to become involved in acts 
of evil against others. An important intervention that can moderate such tendencies is to 
reinforce factors that frame people’s sense of their identity along multiply cross-cutting 
categorizations, whereby people are reminded of the multitude of identities they espouse and 
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share with other individuals (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013) rather than 
dwelling on single group memberships. 
The European Union, made up of different national groups from Europe, seems a good 
example of crossed and multiple categorization principles. During periods of economic upturn 
(when the macroeconomy is flourishing) people express greater support for the unified currency 
as well as their unified overarching European identity, especially in poorer member states. 
However, this appears to be changing in step with the macroeconomic downturn, and the crisis 
of the Euro which culminated in the establishment of a European Stability Mechanism. This 
mechanism is intended to ensure the stability of weaker economies such as Greece, Spain, Italy, 
and Portugal, and at the same time stabilize and maintain the viability of the Euro. However, it 
also reduces the freedom of member-state governments to pursue fiscal policies different from 
other EU member states (Wolinetz, 2012). There has been a parallel rise in Euro-skepticism not 
only amongst member states that have historically been firm supporters of the European 
identity, such as Italy (Fois, 2006); but also within already Euro-skeptic countries such as the 
UK, which has retained its independent currency and where there is strong political resistance to 
any further integration (Kinsman, 2012).  
Euro-skepticism in the different parts of Europe might have differing foundations. For 
example, in the UK such skepticism (exemplified by the UK Independence Party) seems likely to 
be rooted partly in the triangular relationship that the UK has with the USA and continental 
Europe, as well as the notion of the democratic British identity that advocates liberalization and 
enlightenment of other nations (Kinsman, 2012). That is, part of British identity is anchored in 
its ‘special relationship’ with the USA --  a high status reference group that shares much history, 
culture and language. This link perhaps reinforced the UK government’s confidence at the 
December 2011 summit where it vetoed an amendment of the Lisbon 2009 Treaty. Whether or 
not people in the UK feel that this stance is vindicated, and hence their attraction to or 
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disillusion with, the EU may depend in part on whether they view the UK’s economic situation 
as being locked in to that of the EU, and whether or not the USA moves out of step (e.g., faster) 
with either the UK or the EU as a whole.  
For people in the UK, regardless of the objective causal connection between the UK’s 
economic progress and that of the EU and USA, the USA economy offers an alternative possible 
reality (e.g., faster growth, less consumer regulation, association with an independent currency). 
Therefore, people’s perception of the coincidence and differences in situation may affect their 
orientation to the EU.  It seems plausible that if the UK’s economic recovery is sluggish during 
the next ten years this may deepen  the alienation that the British population feels from the EU,  
resulting in political pressure to loosen its ties.  
In other European Union countries, other types of triangular relationship might exist (e.g., 
Finland’s former domination by the Soviet Union, Sweden’s links to Norway, which is not part 
of the EU, etc.). Each of these relationships represents potential new cleavages that might arise if 
economic circumstances press in particular directions. We expect that identity commitments may 
play a powerful role, either militating against, or augmenting, economic pressures to create new 
bonds or break longstanding ones. Powerful historical examples of the strength of identity 
pressures might be the reunification of Germany despite years of the cold war, and conversely 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia to return to constituent separate identities. These show that 
shared identities built solely on economic benefits and utilitarianism may not be robust, whereas 
shared identities that invoke a common core, as seen amongst East and West Germans, are more 
likely to be successful. This may well be the reason for the success of the shared American 
identity which is based on the oft repeated core of liberty and the “American” dream. Thus, the 
economic benefits of the unified state are downplayed in comparison to the libertarian American 
dream that can resonate with such a diverse group of people, many of whom are born outside 
the USA. If the EU countries are to remain as a unified entity may depend on the emergence of a 
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coherent core based on shared values and dreams, perhaps contrasting with some of those 
espoused by the USA.  
The Economy and Social Cohesion 
Social cohesion has been related theoretically and empirically to macroeconomic 
performance. The term social cohesion is used to describe the ties that bring different groups of 
people together within a society. As such social cohesion is intrinsically related to the level of 
trust between different groups in a society (e.g., Forrest & Kearns, 2001). When an economy is 
performing well (flourishing) social cohesion is improved. The opposite is true when the 
economy is suffering. Some scholars even suggest that there is a causal link from social cohesion 
to macroeconomic performance (Dayton-Johnson, 2001). Knack and Keefer (1997) surmise 
several factors involved in the link from social cohesion to macroeconomic performance: 
reduced transaction costs, higher investment ratio, encouragement of innovation, better 
performance of government institutions, lower social costs, more informed citizenry [all via 
increases in trust] (Dayton-Johnson, 2001; McCracken, 1998).  
The relationship between social cohesion and macroeconomic circumstances has been 
discussed by economic historians such as Friedman (2005) who argues that economic growth is 
essential to “greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness 
and dedication to democracy." It is argued that economic upturns can bring about liberalization, 
increases in people’s rights and improved benefits for the needy. In contrast, macroeconomic 
downturns may lead to greater authoritarianism, and totalitarianism as in 1920s and 1930s 
Germany (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Thus, Friedman (2005) argues, societies across the world 
should strive for economic growth which in turn will bring about many associated benefits for 
their populations. Furthermore, economic growth increases people’s optimism about the future, 
thereby increasing people’s overall happiness. Although this seems a plausible argument it does 
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not appear to fit all of the evidence (e.g., Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa, & Zweig, 2010), 
suggesting that the relationship between economic growth and other variables is not uniform. 
Prejudice towards certain minorities in society is likely to increase when economic conditions 
decline. A particular danger point is societal responses to immigration, which becomes more 
salient due to rising unemployment and increased job insecurity (Archer, 2009; Glick, 2005). For 
example, negative attitudes towards undocumented Mexican immigrants in the USA increased 
substantially each year from 2006 to 2009 paralleling the slowing of the macroeconomy. Thus, 
American citizens’ attitudes worsened as unemployment rates increased and GDP real growth 
rate decreased (Diaz, Saenz, & Kwan, 2011). Since immigration does not involve or affect all 
groups of a society equally, it can lead to heightened xenophobia and prejudice towards 
immigrants particularly amongst the poor and lower classes. Thus, examples of social unrest such 
as those in Greece and the UK may become a more common occurrence within the EU if the 
recession deepens or stagnates (cf. Archer, 2009).  
Ethnic prejudice persists even when the immigrant groups are more established and no 
longer consist only of first generation immigrants. Low status ethnic and racial groups such as 
Jews in pre-Nazi Germany and Blacks in the USA have been the scapegoats for the high status 
group’s economic woes. For example, between 1882 and 1930 the number of lynchings of 
Blacks in the Deep South of the USA increased as the price of cotton decreased (Beck & Tolnay, 
1990). Realistic Group Conflict theory highlights the powerful effect of perceived competition 
between groups over the same limited resources that can foster and reinforce such prejudice 
(LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; 
Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955). The theory offers a clear theoretical model for the escalation of 
prejudice that occurs in time of macroeconomic downturns (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 
1997; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong; 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). It is 
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equally important to note that strategies that highlight common interdependence and mutual fate 
across group boundaries can help to counteract such prejudices. 
 Although a common enemy may cement a group and focus its members on the conflict, 
more recent research suggests that, in times of economic recession, overall social cohesion 
decreases and this may be particularly seen in diverse societies that are made up of different 
high/low status and immigrant groups (Costa & Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2007; Stolle, Soroka, & 
Johnston, 2008).  
In fact the idea of social cohesion is quite problematic. We must immediately question the 
level of analysis that the concept applies to, and which set or sets of people are implicated. For 
example, there might be strong cohesion within a cultural or religious or ethnic group that is 
highly dispersed across an otherwise disparate geographical area. There might equally well be 
almost no social or emotional cohesion within a demographically uniform area that appears to 
have no obvious problems.  
Abrams (2010) argued that it is useful to treat the two concepts of prejudice and good 
relations (e.g., social trust and cohesion) as orthogonal (see Table 1). There are situations where 
relations among people appear to be good, for example a neighborhood or town in which there 
are no tensions or conflict and in which prejudice may also be low. This results in harmonious 
cohesion that is tolerant, engaged, open and flexible in relation to outsiders – the UK 
government’s concept of ‘big society’ (Building a Big Society, 2010). However, such communities 
may also exhibit rivalrous cohesion that involves high regard for their own members, but 
competitive, hostile and exclusionary attitudes towards groups that are viewed as subordinates or 
rivals. For example, although supporters of the Celtic and Rangers soccer teams are generally 
Scottish, they are deeply committed to their own teams, which are fierce rivals and have different 
religions for their fan base. Conversely, when relations are not so good within a community it 
does not automatically imply that there will be prejudice. People may simply exist in a state of 
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benign indifference, a community that is atomized, disengaged and unconcerned about others either 
within or beyond the community. Finally, there is the notion described by the UK Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, as ‘broken society’. In this scenario there are areas in which good 
relations are low and prejudices are high, a condition of malign antipathy, characterized by 
fragmented, discontented, disengaged communities of people who feel hostile both to internal 
and external agencies.  
It seems likely that changes in economic circumstances can promote or inhibit social 
psychological communities of these different types. As we note later, both the malign antipathy 
and rivalrous cohesion scenarios hold significant risks, while benign indifference surely leads to 
missed opportunities. Of course, because identity and the economy are intertwined, the degree 
and type of cohesion in society is likely to facilitate or inhibit the success of the macroeconomy. 
Thus, societies characterized by harmonious cohesion are likely to value diversity, encourage 
people to develop, and be creative, all of which could help its economy to flourish. Societies 
characterized by inequalities and prejudice, and particularly malign antipathy, seem likely to 
inhibit creativity and productivity which in turn would constrain the economy (e.g., Ritzen, 
Easterly, & Woolcock, 2000).  
Longer Term Prospects: Three Scenarios 
Although social psychology often focuses on very short term, even transitory and implicit 
effects, the relationship between identity and the economic environment needs to be considered 
over a larger time scale and on a broader canvas. We have provided an illustrative analysis of 
different economic scenarios in Table 2 to consider how three longer term scenarios – recession, 
stagnation and growth (in the columns labeled A, B, C, respectively) might relate to different 
types of outcomes – for identity, for individuals, groups, and society as a whole (represented in 
rows 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively). We also consider the most significant dangers or threats and the 
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greatest potential opportunities or potential benefits implied by these scenarios (rows 5 and 6, 
respectively). We refer to particular situations using cell references in the following discussion.  
Recession (Scenario A). It could be that recession follows solely from factors that are 
internal to a region or country, such as lack of productivity, rising unemployment, and the 
financial burden of the welfare state. However, external factors are also likely to be involved.  
For example, in the EU, one of the economically weaker member countries might default and 
leave the Euro.  
Alternatively, the financial burden of supporting weaker groups might weaken the larger 
group. For example, sustaining bankrupt countries in the EU may mean that the European 
economy as a whole becomes starved of investment and recedes rather than grows. A likely 
consequence is that economies of countries may also suffer, whereas they might potentially have 
flourished if they had been independent.  
Under any of these circumstances, in the absence of relevant counteractive forces, evidence 
suggests that a group would experience a decline in broad (harmonious) social cohesion (A3), 
while individuals would experience adverse effects in terms of physical and psychological health 
and wellbeing (A2). These adverse effects for individuals’ health and wellbeing are likely to be 
more pronounced for members of low status groups who would likely be chosen as the 
scapegoats amidst the decline in social cohesion (cf. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). There is also a 
high risk of rivalrous cohesion (A4) as people shift their attention from potentially negative 
personal identities and focus instead on potentially enhancing group identities. This could mean 
they would become more nationalistic or parochial (A1), more hostile toward both superordinate 
structures (e.g., their government or the EU as a whole), and more defensive of local structures 
such as their town, street, church, community group, ethnic group and so on. They may also 
bind more strongly with idiosyncratic 'interest' groups linked by social media. Factors that 
highlight unjust procedures for distributing resources, that widen group differences, and that 
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increase the competitive interdependence between groups will exacerbate such tendencies (A5). 
On the other hand, such circumstances might be a basis for establishing a stronger communal 
identity, concern for others and so on, which could serve as important social capital for recovery 
(A6). 
Notably, all these different factors would affect high and low status groups differently. 
Nationalistic tendencies and their disastrous consequences for low status groups arising from 
rivalrous cohesion in times of macroeconomic recessions were discussed earlier in relation to 
Nazi Germany and the American South in the 1880’s. More recently, several EU countries have 
seen a rise in support for nationalistic parties that openly demand for the restriction of rights of 
immigrants and low status groups (i.e., the British National Party, the UK Independence Party, 
and the English Defense League within the UK, and the Golden Dawn party in Greece). Our 
analysis suggests that policy makers would be well advised to consider social identity approaches 
when devising macroeconomic policies for dealing with recession because the capacity to move 
towards economic growth may be reduced if, during downturns, a country has become less 
cohesive and has fractured along group lines.  
Stagnation (Scenario B). A second scenario, and perhaps the most likely (e.g., following 
the example of the last decade or so in Japan), is economic stagnation. As various governments, 
banks and other agencies struggle to satisfy multiple demands for caution, austerity, investment 
and growth it seems probable that nothing much will change very quickly. However, stagnation 
may also bring with it another significant risk, a substantial increase in levels of uncertainty. As 
highlighted earlier, uncertainty throws identity into question (B1), which may result in a retreat to 
familiar and localized relationships and identities (B2). This could also lead to a gradual decline in 
wider societal cohesion as people narrow the range of their social identities and commitments to 
others and a more general state of benign indifference ensues (B5).  
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Continuing uncertainty or stagnation could eventually prompt people to seek greater 
meaning and predictability in their lives. This situation may provide fertile grounds for the 
emergence of system-rejecting ideologies, resistance, and challenges to social order, potentially 
including constructive and creative routes for social and economic progress (B3, B4). 
Unfortunately it is also likely to stimulate efforts by those with power to consolidate their powers 
and influence, to impose more restrictive regulations and regimes, to ‘crack down’ on dissenters, 
and so forth. Moreover, times of uncertainty may bring greater dangers for low status groups, 
who may often be blamed for the continuing uncertainty. Thus, stagnation may create conditions 
that create opportunities for change (on the positive side) but could be very destabilizing (on the 
negative side). Given that these types of response are likely to arise because of people’s need for 
a secure and predictable identity, it seems possible that strategies to promote constructive 
responses to economic stagnation might focus on building and supporting positive identities as a 
driver (not merely a consequence) of economic change (B6).   
The relevance of certainty is illustrated by a recent quantitative analysis of the texts of 
televised leader debates during the 2010 UK general election (Abrams, 2012). This established 
that both Nick Clegg and David Cameron (the challengers) used the theme  of certainty very 
strongly in their language and arguments, whereas Gordon Brown (the incumbent Prime 
Minister) focused significantly more on uncertainty. In hindsight, it is not surprising that Labour 
(Brown) lost the election and that the new coalition government was formed between the 
Liberals (Clegg) and Conservatives (Cameron), both of whom were trying to offer greater 
certainty. However, the coalition has been continually criticized  for its many ‘U-turns’, and 
conflicts of principle (between the two parties), reflecting the problem that in reality both the 
challenges and solutions are extremely uncertain. One risk is that continuing uncertainty may 
undermine the electorate’s  confidence in the political system’s ability to deal with uncertainty. If 
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this happens we might expect to see an increase in people’s use of alternative methods to acquire 
certainty through secure and stable social identity. 
We assume that it is generally desirable to promote harmonious cohesion (even if some 
rivalrous cohesion is valuable at times). This is not just because harmony is psychologically and 
socially more pleasant,  but because diversity and complexity promote creativity (Crisp & R. N. 
Turner, 2011). Therefore, attending to the identity dynamics required for such cohesion might be 
particularly important during long periods of potential uncertainty. Thus, in periods of stagnation 
governments and policy makers may be wise to promote greater respect for diversity and 
highlight the value that diverse workforces bring to the economy. 
Growth (Scenario C). A third scenario is that the macroeconomy strengthens and, in 
tandem, local or national economy flourishes. In this scenario we may expect people to feel more 
optimistic, to focus a little more on their personal prospects and identity, and to become more 
open to different cross-cutting social identities (C1). Although increasing prosperity may feed 
into greater individualism (and perhaps lack of concern for other groups that remain 
disadvantaged), overall we would expect improved social cohesion and trust between different 
groups in society, greater openness and more proactive behavior that creates a virtuous spiral of 
innovation and productivity (harmonious cohesion – C3, C4, C6; cf. Packer & Kugler, 2013). 
The improved macroeconomic circumstances should also support an improvement in people’s 
health and wellbeing (e.g., Diener, Diener, & Diener, 2005) [C2]. Furthermore, we would expect 
that people would identify more strongly with the higher level (e.g., European) unified identity, 
whereas nationalistic or more parochial ties may be weakened (C3, C4).  We would therefore also 
expect macroeconomic growth to lead to greater integration of low status groups within the 
wider society.  
A further possibility is that people perceive the local economy as succeeding despite or beyond 
wider macroeconomic conditions, and that people identify their ingroup interests as more 
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distinct and contrasting with those of other groups (rivalrous cohesion). In the case of the UK 
vis-à-vis Europe as a whole this seems likely to depend on what happens to the USA economy. 
For example if the US economy improves faster than the European economy, the UK may treat 
the US as a reference point to contrast the “failures” of Europe. This scenario could result in a 
rise of UK ethnocentrism, parochialism, and indifference to the fate of neighboring countries, 
perhaps together with significantly less tolerance of diversity within the UK, and the potential for 
increased conflict and tension if particular groups become targeted or scapegoated (C5). This 
type of reaction would be a type of nationalistic collective pride (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 
2001), which might be associated with Schadenfruede (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doojse, 
2003) in response to other countries’ problems, and indifference to the wider global picture. An 
implication for policy makers is that times of economic growth should be seized upon to 
stimulate awareness of multiply categorized and cross-cutting group identities as a means of 
encouraging creativity and innovation, and hence further growth. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, all economic scenarios hold both risks and opportunities. Understanding and 
anticipating these requires investment in measurement, monitoring and analysis of individual and 
societal responses to the economic horizon. That is, we believe meeting the challenges of 
economic change requires an explicitly social psychological analysis and not a purely economic 
one. Although social identity is by no means the only, or necessarily most important, determinant 
of behavioral responses, it is certainly an important element. Understanding how people sustain 
and develop positive social and personal identity in different types of socioeconomic climate 
therefore can help us to anticipate potentially costly problems and reach for potentially beneficial 
strategies for the future – strategies that should take into account people’s position as individuals, 
as group members, and as part of society as a whole. 
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This paper argued that  the macroeconomy and identity are almost inevitably bidirectionally 
linked. Changes in the macroeconomy affect the salience of, and people’s affiliations with, 
different groups, and thus affect the level of social cohesion and connectedness between 
different groups in society. However, changes in the identities people espouse or aspire to can 
also lead to changes in the macroeconomy. Thus, while it is important to sustain distinctive 
identities, policy makers need to be careful before emphasizing strong fractures (e.g., along 
political, national or ethnic lines) and be wary of inhibiting people’s recognition of their shared 
identity at higher levels of abstraction (e.g., at a continental or global level). Such strategies may 
be politically expedient in the short run but seem likely, in the long run, to perpetuate economic 
downturn or stagnation, and in general greater civic disengagement, and prejudice towards low 
status social groups. 
On the other hand, recognizing and valuing diversity whilst also fostering a common, 
superordinate identity (as a European citizen) and working on common economic and political 
goals, seems most likely to help improve macroeconomic circumstances, to promote greater 
tolerance, and respect for human rights and equality. A key challenge then, is how to maintain 
diversity and distinctiveness at levels that satisfy people’s need for meaning and positive identity 
(Brewer, 2003), whilst also ensuring there is a unified focus on values, goals and characteristics 
that bind wider communities together to sustain real social cohesion. We believe that social 
psychologists should be informing these strategies every bit as much as economists, 
philosophers, sociologists and politicians. 
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Table 1: Societal Characteristics Based on a Typology of Good Relations and Prejudice [reproduced 
with permission from Abrams (2010), Processes of Prejudice: Theory, Evidence and Intervention] 
 
 
 
 
  
Prejudice 
 
 
 
 
Low High 
 
 
Good 
relations 
Low 
Benign 
indifference 
 
Atomized, 
disengaged 
community, 
unconcerned about 
others 
 
 
 
Malign 
antipathy 
 
Fragmented, 
discontented, 
disengaged 
community hostile to 
both internal and 
external rivals or 
enemies 
 
High 
 
Harmonious 
cohesion 
 
Cohesive, tolerant, 
engaged 
community, open 
and flexible 
 
 
 
Rivalrous 
cohesion 
 
Cohesive, engaged 
community but 
competitive towards 
subordinates, rivals 
and enemies 
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Table 2: Implications of Three Economic Scenarios: Recession, Stagnation and Growth 
 
 A) Recession B) Stagnation C) Growth 
1) Initial  
implications 
for identity 
Pessimism: 
Possible depression, anger, 
disidentification with 
existing groups, and/or 
stronger identification with 
rebellious groups or with 
independent self-
sustaining groups. 
Disengagement: 
Uncertainty/ search for 
meaning. Sense of 
vulnerability, ambivalence, 
indifference,  hesitancy. 
Search for new social 
identities. 
Optimism: 
Greater individualism but 
also increased social 
diversity and complexity, 
new groups and identities 
established. 
2) 
Implications 
for 
individuals 
Dejection: 
Personal deprivation, 
isolation, vulnerability, 
mistrust of others, 
competitiveness, low self-
efficacy, disengagement. 
Risk aversion: 
Low behavioral 
commitment, caution,  
focus on personal/family 
rather than group. 
Greater trust: 
Wider psychological 
horizon – more options 
considered as feasible for 
self,  more proactive 
response to opportunities. 
Improved health and well-
being. 
3) 
Implications 
for groups 
Parochialism: 
Collective relative 
deprivation, resentment, 
scapegoating, xenophobia, 
prejudice, conflict, system 
rejection, protest. Lower 
status groups become 
targets of prejudice.  
Extremism and creativity: 
Identity, distinctiveness 
becomes a vehicle for 
recruiting vulnerable 
individuals (e.g. to 
religious, political or other 
groups offering clearly 
defined positive identity). 
Could generate both 
creativity and extremism, 
but hampered by lack of 
resources. Social capital 
may be vital element for 
group success. 
Harmonious cohesion: 
Higher level of security and 
confidence,  less 
dependence on 
comparisons with other 
groups (status concerns 
attenuate), greater 
flexibility, more openness 
to cross cutting and 
interlinking memberships, 
immigration, emigration. 
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 A) Recession B) Stagnation C) Growth 
4) 
Implications 
for society 
Intergroup bias and 
conflict: 
Fracturing along group 
lines – powerful and vested 
interests dominate and 
exploit, weaker groups 
atomize or unable to act 
coherently due to limited 
resources. Increasing 
burden on charitable 
‘safety net’ and 
security/emergency 
services. 
Stagnancy: 
Inertia or gradual fracture. 
No response to promote 
societal change. Groups 
focus inward rather than 
outward. Intranational 
scramble for 
status/redistribution rather 
than aiming for growth and 
development. Increased 
focus on individual 
freedoms and 
interpersonal justice. 
Tolerance: 
Wider acceptance of 
shared values and 
tolerance of different 
values, greater flexibility 
and responsiveness to 
opportunities, more 
ambitious and creative 
activity, secure national 
identity, pride etc. 
5) Biggest 
danger 
Malign antipathy: 
Social disintegration, 
increase in prejudice, 
blame, mistrust, 
dependency on state or 
crime, loss of common 
identity, weakening of 
consensual values, rise of 
ethnocentrism and 
xenophobia. 
Benign indifference: 
Graduate decline in 
societal cohesion, absence 
of proactive development. 
Bohemianism and 
rivalrous cohesion: Break 
down of engagement with 
system, structures etc., 
decadence (unlikely in 
foreseeable future), 
complacency. Alternatively, 
emergence of nation-level 
rivalrous cohesion based 
on contempt for other 
countries or cultures. 
6) Biggest 
opportunity 
Shared identity: 
Use adversity as basis for 
establishing shared 
identity. Use shared 
identity as route for 
cooperative, constructive 
mutual support, building 
resilience and social capital 
for recovery. 
Harmonious social 
cohesion: 
Use identity as route for 
building/motivating 
development, change, 
growth. Increase certainty 
and harmonious social 
cohesion. 
Diversity: 
Identity-based 
development and growth, 
building on diversity, 
flexibility, new ways of 
working and being. 
Cooperation with other 
superordinate level groups 
to activate larger shared 
goals. 
 
